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Internally Displaced Persons and the Cyprus Peace Process 
 
Abstract  
The article focuses on the Greek Cypriot Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) and their 
attitudes towards the island’s reunification talks. We utilize quantitative data from two 
representative sample surveys, conducted in 2016-2017, probing respondents on their 
views on territorial readjustments, property provisions and power-sharing. Contrary to 
findings in the literature, IDP status is associated with higher levels of support for a 
negotiated peace settlement. The article examines the impact of anticipated threats and 
economic opportunities accompanying a settlement and suggests a set of institutionalized 
mechanisms to incorporate the views of IDPs and other disadvantaged groups in future 
reunification talks.  
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Introduction  
Peace processes rarely facilitate institutionalized IDP participation nor do they encourage 
information gathering through public opinion surveys on their preferences.1 Cyprus provides a 
paradigmatic case where the right of return has been a key priority, especially for Greek 
Cypriots, yet IDPs are not represented at negotiations, and there is no related research on the 
potential advantages of their inclusion. This article addresses this gap in peace studies and public 
opinion research using two public opinion surveys focusing on Greek Cypriot displaced persons 
and their attitudes to the prospective political institutions of a reunited Cyprus. Our data 
collected before and after the 2017 UN peace talks probes respondents’ possible alternatives to 
the ‘Guterres package’, labelled after the UN Secretary General (UNSG) Antonio Guterres.  
 The article’s main objectives are threefold. First, we focus on Greek Cypriot displaced 
persons as the primary stake-holders in the Cyprus peace process. Although it is assumed the 
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Greek Cypriot IDPs could be potential beneficiaries of a settlement in the form of bizonnal 
bicommunal federation (BBF), little attention has been paid to their attitudes; a fundamental 
difference between the two sides is that Greek Cypriots maintain ‘the right of return’ while 
Turkish Cypriots prioritize the current status quo. We ask how this thinking affects their 
responses to a possible settlement. Second, we highlight a broader question concerning the role 
of IDP-specific research in conflict resolution studies. As Cyprus is now enjoying stability and 
increased communication between the two main communities, we suggest lessons from the 
island could be applicable elsewhere. Third, we incorporate to our analysis the social 
psychological antecedents of support for a prospective solution or its lack thereof. By doing so, 
we locate a practical real-life political phenomenon of the Cyprus peace process in everyday 
intergroup behaviour, past and present. 
 
Intergroup Relations and Internally Displaced Persons  
 
Existing research has demonstrated how perceived threats elicit behaviour to reduce 
exposure to risk at both personal and group levels (Huddy et al., 2002). As a group level process, 
perceived threats from outgroup(s) are prevalent among those previously exposed to political 
violence and conflict (Canetti-Nisim et al., 2009; Canetti-Nisim, Halperin, Sharvit and Hobfoll, 
2009). It is important to consider how this experience, in the case of Greek Cypriots 
displacement experience, affects present perceptions of threat and attitudes to a political process 
designed to address it. An often-unchallenged view in the literature is that protracted refugee 
situations produce radicalized populations (Adelman, 1998; Sude, Stebbins, and Weiland, 2015; 
Lischer 2015). As refugees and IDPs suffer disproportionately during displacement campaigns, 
they may be more likely to want revenge when opportunities arise (Achvarina and Reich, 2006; 
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Choi and Piazza, 2016; Bohnet et al., 2018). These tendencies could be aggravated if the right of 
return is either restricted or difficult to implement after the passage of time, as in Cyprus. Thus 
far, the evidence on whether return in post-conflict communities is mixed, with some finding it 
feasible under specific conditions (Stefanovic and Loizides, 2017) and others unrealistic 
(Adelman and Barkan, 2011; Zolberg et al. 1986). Even though the literature identifies the 
pitfalls of securitizing displacement crises and their victims (Jaconsen 2002; Greenhill, 2010), 
few public opinion studies challenge these claims or point to potential pro-peace attitudes among 
IDPs. To address this gap, our article highlights the exclusion-amid-inclusion (EAI) dilemma 
(Agarin and McCulloch, 2020), probing the potential role of IDPs as peace agents (rather than as 
unconditional or occasional spoilers). We argue that what is missing in the Cyprus talks is not 
only designated IDP representation at the official level but also other inclusive procedures 
involving for instance the inclusion of IDP representatives (including those in the diaspora) in 
specialized technical commitees on implementing the right of return and individual consultation 
with property owners through new census technologies as to their preferences on return, 
restitution, and overall settlement provisions.  
Cyprus is a critical case study for the role of the IDPs in peace processes; in the Greek 
Cypriot community, rights are prominent in official discourses, nonetheless, IDPs and their 
associations have no formal role in the peace negotiations. Designated representation is missing 
at the official level, as are other inclusive procedures, for instance, individual or group 
consultation with displaced property owners. Cyprus is not alone in this: IDPs and refugees are 
generally under-represented in peace processes. While Cyprus arguably constitutes a case of 
refugee-citizens with some degree of inclusivity through national or local elections (Demetriou, 
2018), marginalization is much wider in third cases where IDPs have either lost their voting 
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rights within their home states (e.g. in Georgia or Turkey/Kurds) or have been deprived 
citizenship in third countries (e.g. Syrians in the Middle East). Even in Cyprus under-
representation of IDPs is evident: the Republic’s 2018 cabinet, according to official online bios, 
lacked any IDP members, even though the latter constitute one-third of the population.  This lack 
of representation has been a serious impediment to the peace process. As this article 
demonstrates, IDP respondents are more likely to vote for a peace settlement in Cyprus while 
IDP status is a statistically significant predictor of acceptance of power-sharing arrangements 
across different models.  
 
Cypriot Displacement Context 
Both Greek and Turkish Cypriots have suffered from forced displacement in their recent 
past but have reacted differently to their suffering. For the most part, Greek Cypriots have 
emphasised the right of return while Turkish Cypriots want to preserve the island’s new political 
realities and ensure a ‘demographically secure’ Turkish Cypriot entity (Necatigil, 1989; Yesilada 
and Sozen, 2002: 275). In their narratives, Turkish Cypriots focus on their position as a 
numerical minority during the 1963-1964 bi-communal clashes when they were forced to settle 
in enclaves scattered across a Greek-dominated island while Greek Cypriots emphasize the 
events of 1974 when Turkish troops partitioned Cyprus, forcing approximately 160,000 Greek 
Cypriots to flee their cities and villages (Loizos, 2008; Georgiades, 2009; Bryant, 2011; 
Dikomitis, 2012). During the same period, around 40,000 Turkish Cypriots living in the South 
were coerced or chose to move to the North which, since 1983, has functioned as a non-
recognized state (Bertrand, 2004). Turkish Cypriots prioritize maintaining a federally 
autonomous and demographically secure entity in the northern part of Cyprus. Return to pre-
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1974 homes has been an issue primarily in the context of compensations and mutual exchange of 
properties, and so far no Turkish Cypriot political party has championed the return of their own 
displaced, although moderate parties have been more open to multiculturalism and 
accommodating the Greek Cypriot right of return to the north, a priority for Greek Cypriots.  
In a nutshell, the Cyprus problem reflects many of the contradictions of 
consociationalism noted in the introduction of this special issue. On the one hand, the proposed 
BBF may lead to the inclusion of Turkish Cypriots and provide the basis for political equality 
between the two communities (Lijphart, 2004). On the other, it may restrict rights among the 
displaced, particularly among the numerically larger Greek Cypriot community to promote the 
autonomy of the numerically smaller Turkish Cypriot community. This is a fundamental but not 
necessarily unresolvable challenge for Lijphart’s consociational reasoning: while his fourth pillar 
of consociationalism, segmental autonomy might appear unproblematic in most occasions, in 
Cyprus the challenge is to balance the needs of two sides in the same territorial space.  
Until 2003, the two communities had few opportunities for contact, as only limited 
interactions were permitted across the dividing line. The opening of checkpoints in 2003 created 
opportunities for contact and improved intergroup relations. Since then, an estimated 40 million 
crossings have taken place. There is now regular unstructured contact: people cross to shop, 
trade, attend school, sightsee, and visit friends . The beneficial effects of contacts that entail 
talking to each other either directly (McKeown and Psaltis, 2017) or indirectly through extended 
cross-group friendships ([name omitted] under review) or social media friendships (Žeželj et al., 
2017) on improving attitudes and reducing prejudice are well documented. One of the most 
encouraging findings is that cross-group friendships between Greek Cypriots and Turkish 
Cypriots multiplied between 2007 and 2017. Nevertheless, a significant portion of both 
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communities does not cross the divide regularly; to date only, about one-third of the Greek 
Cypriot community and 40-50 percent of the Turkish Cypriot community have regular contact 
with members of the other community by crossing the checkpoints frequently (ibid) while until 
today, 16 years since the opening of the checkpoints, about one third of Greek Cypriots never 
crossed to the north. 
Understanding antecedents of support for a peace settlement is important, but to the best 
of our knowledge no research has focused on IDPs. This is surprising as IDPs are the primary 
stake-holders; they are the most affected by the conflict and will be the most affected by a 
solution.  However, efforts to reach a settlement in Cyprus have repeatedly failed, leaving IDPs 
and their rights in limbo. In 2004, the efforts to reach a settlement almost came to fruition but 
even then IDP status played a minor, albeit positive, role, and  ‘only fractionally more refugees 
voted “Yes” than did the general population’(Loizos, 2008: 94). At the time, IDPs were 
promised either a quick return to the talks (i.e. a ‘new better deal’) or material compensations 
that never materialized.  
In this article, we present new findings on Greek Cypriot IDPs and their attitudes toward 
the Turkish Cypriots, and how these relate to their position on the Cyprus peace process and 
power-sharing in particular. In the first study of February-March 2016, we investigate their 
support or lack of support thereof for the specific aspects of the proposed settlement to the 
Cyprus problem. In the second study, which was conducted shortly after the collapse of the final 
UN round of talks at Crans Montana in July 2017, we delve into social psychological antecedents 
of their current position: Perceived threats to the Greek Cypriot values and beliefs; perceptions of 
GCs unreadiness for a solution and the dysfunctionality of a prospective solution well as 
anticipation of meddling by Turkey in the internal affairs of the new state; and benefits 
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(economic opportunities & free movement) to a possible solution as well as trust towards 
Turkish Cypriots and the attitude of Greek Cypriots towards the opening of the checkpoints. 
Study 1: Pre-Guterrez Survey  
Research Methods  
Sample: The first survey was conducted by the University Centre for Field Studies of the 
University of Cyprus in Nicosia, Cyprus, through telephone interviews in Greek using the 
NIPO/CATI program. The phone survey used both land lines and mobile phone numbers and ran 
from 29 February 2016 to 22 March 2016. Participants came from both urban and rural areas in 
each district of the Republic of Cyprus (Greek Cypriot community). Eligible participants were 
over 18 and had voting rights. The total sample included 1605 participants.  Cooperation rate 
reached 24.8 percent.  
Questionnaire: The questionnaire was developed in English and then translated into and 
back translated from Greek to ensure conceptual and semantic equivalence (Brislin, 1970). It 
took a mean of 13 minutes to complete and consisted of five parts, one of which was a special 
part completed only by IDPs. The five parts included: demographic questions (gender, age, IDP 
status, place of residence in terms of district and area [rural or urban], and educational level); 
their stance in a future referendum, etc. The special part for IDPs included questions in binary 
form asking about their relationship to their lost properties and their intention to return in the 
event of a solution. They were also asked about their stance on bicommunal relations and the 
Cyprus issue, especially their return intentions under Greek Cypriot or Turkish Cypriot 
administration in the event of a solution. 
 
Results 
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Study 1 yielded useful statistical information about IDPs. In particular, in 2016, the first 
generation IDPs were estimated to be 19.8 percent of the IDP population, with a margin of error 
of two percent and 95 percent level of confidence. The second generation IDPs whose fathers 
were displaced represented 30.1 percent of all IDPs; those whose mothers were displaced totalled 
29.1 percent. Over a third, 37.7 percent, said they owned property in the north. Once these three 
categories (first generation, second generation, property owner) were amalgamated into a binary 
variable, 43.4 percent of the sample satisfied one or more of the above criteria.  
About a third of the IDPs said they never thought of returning if there were a solution, 
another third said they rarely or sometimes thought about it, and another third said they were 
always thinking about it. When they were specifically asked ‘If there is a settlement in 2016, 
how likely it is for you to return and live in your pre-1974 home under Greek Cypriot 
administration in the next 3 years?’, 59.5 percent said they would likely or very likely return. 
When the same question was asked in the same way but ‘under Turkish Cypriot administration’, 
numbers dropped significantly, to 22.5 percent. 
In this telephone survey, all participants (IDPs and non-IDPs) with voting rights in the 
Greek Cypriot community were asked about their stance if there was a referendum and their 
political party supported a Yes vote. About 40 percent said they tended towards voting Yes or 
were sure to vote Yes, about 26 percent tended towards or were sure to vote No, and about 34 
percent were equally likely to vote Yes or No. The results are shown in Table 1. 
When we compared the answers of IDPs and non-IDPs we discovered significant 
differences. Notably, the percentage of non-IPDs determined to reject a plan was almost double 
the percentage of IDPs challenging the refugee radicalization thesis (Adelman, 1998).  
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Table 1. Stance on possible referendum 
 
 IDPs Non IDPs 
I would vote yes for sure 21.4% 20.5% 
I would most likely vote for yes 19.6% 18.2% 
Yes and no are equally likely 37.2% 32.5% 
I would most likely vote for no 9.3% 7.8% 
I would vote no for sure 12.5% 21.0% 
Total 100% 100% 
 
 
At this point, we filtered out the Sure Yes and Sure No and asked the rest of the 
participants the following question: ‘If you are unsure, would you vote for the settlement, if it 
includes provisions to replace Ankara’s for EU guarantees?’ This resulted in about one-third of 
the undecided changing their vote to a definite Yes and only 17 percent changing their vote to a 
definite No. IDP status was unrelated to the distribution of these answers. The responses 
suggested that under this scenario, a Sure Yes could go up to 43 percent and a Most Likely Yes 
to 13.2 percent, leaving us with 56.2 percent of Greek Cypriots who would definitely or probably 
vote Yes. 
An additional scenario with an IDP-specific focus asked both IDPs and non-IDPs ‘If you 
are unsure, would you vote for the settlement, if it includes provisions to secure that the 
overwhelming majority of refugees have the first say as to their properties?’ In this scenario, 
two-thirds of the undecideds shifted to a definite Yes. In this case, there was a tendency for the 
IDPs, as expected, to support Yes in greater numbers than non-IDPs, but the difference did not 
reach statistical significance. 
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Table 2. Repositioning of undecided under the following scenario: ‘If you are unsure, would you 
vote for the settlement, if it includes provisions to secure that the overwhelming majority of 
refugees to have the first say as to their properties?’ 
 
I would vote yes for sure 68.6% 
I would most likely vote for yes 16.2% 
Yes and no are equally likely 10.4% 
I would most likely vote for no 2.3% 
I would vote for no for sure 2.5% 
Total 100% 
 
 
As these findings show, Greek Cypriots (both IDPs and non-IDPs) are concerned about 
property issues and want IDPs to be able to choose how to deal with their property. This comes 
as no surprise, of course, given the widely shared representation of the Cyprus issue in the Greek 
Cypriot community as a problem of Turkish territorial occupation. However, it is also clear that 
in areas that will fall under Turkish Cypriot administration, only a small minority of IDPs will 
request restitution for their properties. This point is vital for Turkish Cypriots, as they fear losing 
the demographic majority in the north after a solution.  
Although this has been a very difficult impediment in the negotiations, as we argue 
elsewhere, new information and communication technologies might create opportunities for the 
two sides to collect data ahead of the negotiations, meeting the objectives of all sides (see also 
Andrade and Doolin, 2016). Those hailing from areas in the future Turkish Cypriot constituent 
state are more likely to be accommodated if their preferences on restitution, compensation or a 
combination of these and other options are known in advance to the mediators. One reason for 
limiting the role of IDP-specific representation in the negotiations is the fear that IDPs might act 
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as spoilers, but our research suggests the opposite: IDPs have a promising profile. These data 
must be made accessible to all stakeholders in the peace process.  
The undecided were also asked: ‘Under what conditions would you accept a system of 
rotating presidency (select all that applies)?’ The majority selected option five in Table 3 (‘I 
would never accept a rotating presidency’) and did not choose any of the other options, even 
though they could pick more than one.  
 
Table 3. Acceptance of rotating presidency under varying conditions among undecided voters 
(support for each condition in percentages) 
                                                                                                                                                                                                    
Condition 
 
% 
If the rotating presidents have limited duties and dedicated to resolving deadlocks 9 
If the cabinet includes only one-third Turkish Cypriot ministers 10.5 
If rotating presidents took decisions together for all maters 14.8 
Greek Cypriots also vote for the Turkish Cypriot co-president constituting 20 per cent 
of total voters 
19.1 
I would never accept a system of rotational presidency even if 1-4  are included 54.3 
Total*             
* Total exceeds 100 percent, as participants could select more than one option. 
              
 
The fact that 54.3 percent of undecided voters said they would never support a rotational 
presidency in any guise is worrying from the perspective of getting a Yes vote in a referendum, 
since if we assume about half of undecided voters would vote No on a peace plan with a rotating 
presidency, then the No vote presented in Table 1 rises to 47 percent of voters. Even though a 
presidential form of power-sharing has dominated the mediations in Cyprus so far, such an 
arrangement would not have been the preferred institutional choice of most consociational 
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theorists (Lijphart, 2004; Linz 1990; McGarry 2011). Thus, in future surveys, it is worth 
examining the impact of non-presidential systems and whether alternative models could increase 
support for a settlement.  
Another interesting dimension of the finding on the rotating presidency is that political 
preferences differ significantly when comparing IDPs with non-IDPs. Overall, non-IDPs are less 
willing to share power with Turkish Cypriots than IDPs (see Table 4). 
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Table 4. Acceptance of rotating presidency under varying conditions by undecided IDP and non-
IDP voters (support for each condition in percentages) 
                                                                                                                                                                                                    
Condition 
 
%  
                                             IDP Non-
IDP 
If the rotating presidents have limited duties and dedicated to resolving 
deadlocks 
8.4 9.6 
If the cabinet includes only one-third Turkish Cypriot ministers 13.8 7.8 
If rotating presidents took decisions together for all maters 19.5 10.8 
Greek Cypriots also vote for the Turkish Cypriot co-president constituting 20 
per cent of total voters 
24.3 14.7 
I would never accept a system of rotational presidency even if 1-4  are included 50.6 57.5 
Total*    
 
* Totals exceed 100 percent, as participants could select more than one option 
 
 
Study 1 Discussion  
Given the findings, particularly the fact that IDPs take a significantly different stance on 
power-sharing than non-IDPs, it is worth further exploring a host of other factors publicly 
discussed as reasons for Greek Cypriots’ rejection of power sharing,2 such as security concerns, 
territorial concerns and trust. We explored one of these factors in the second survey. A crucial 
element of the six-point Guterres framework was for Greek Cypriots to offer Turkish Cypriots 
participation in power sharing in exchange for the return of the town of Morphou. Morphou was 
an almost entirely Greek Cypriot town in 1974 (home to 6,480) and since then has been included 
in each of the five versions of territorial adjustment in the Annan plan and in previous UN 
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proposals, such as the Ghali Set of Ideas of 1992 (Michael, 2007). In the second survey, we 
explored factors that increase or decrease the possibility of acceptance of this element of the 
Guterres framework in the Greek Cypriot community. We were specifically interested in whether 
IDPs had different preferences than non-IDPs, controlling for a number of demographic 
variables. We also tested the predictive strength of various social psychological variables openly 
discussed as hopes and fears in the Greek Cypriot press just before the collapse of the Crans 
Montana negotiations (UNDP, 2015). 
 
Study 2: Post-Guterres Survey  
 
Research Methods  
Sample: This survey was conducted by the University Centre for Field Studies of the 
University of Cyprus using a representative sample survey of 8113 participants and face-to-face 
interviews. Participants were over 18 years old with voting rights. Fieldwork lasted from 23 
November 2017 to 28 December 2017. Margin of error was three percent with a level of 
confidence of 95 percent. Participants were drawn from both urban and rural areas using 
multistage stratified sampling.  
Questionnaire: The questionnaire took about 45 minutes to complete and had eight parts:  
demographic information, displacement experience, acceptance of solution based on Guterres 
framework, specific trade-off elements relating to rotating presidency, hopes and fears of a 
federal solution, symbolic threats, attitudes towards opening of checkpoints and intergroup trust 
(see Supplementary Material). In addition, participants were asked to position themselves on 
whether they accepted the following possibilities as a satisfactory solution, accepted them as a 
solution of necessity/if necessary or rejected them: bizonal bicommunal federation (BBF), two 
states, unitary state, keeping the status quo. We did this to decipher the post-Crans Montana 
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attitudes of Greek Cypriots towards these options.  
 
 
Results 
For a more focused analysis of predictors of power-sharing, it is important to establish 
the general attitudes of Greek Cypriots to various solutions in the post-Crans Montana period, as 
such an analysis makes sense only if a BBF is still an option. The Crans Montana failure 
increased the number of Greek Cypriots who were sceptical of a BBF; the percentage of our 
participants who rejected a BBF in various gradations reached 41.7 percent, one of highest 
registered in the Greek Cypriot community in recent years. Crucially, however, it was far from 
becoming a majority view. We found that 36.3 percent accepted it as a compromise solution and 
an additional  21.9 percent found it a satisfactory solution. In other words, a majority – 58.2 
percent – was committed to BBF as the solution of the Cyprus problem.4  
 Since 2018, there has been public discussion of a two-state solution as a ‘Plan B’ in case 
the BBF model becomes unacceptable to the two communities. However, our data suggest the 
majority of GCs reject this option. In particular, the majority (70.8 percent) of GCs even after the 
Crans Montana failure reject the two-state solution. On the particular question of whether the 
participants would accept a plan based on the Guterres framework as a solution, the majority of 
Greek Cypriots (57.2 percent) said they were undecided whilst 23.8 percent rejected it and 19.6 
percent accepted it as a satisfactory solution. When we compared the level of support for a 
solution on the basis of the Guterres framework among IDPs and non-IDPs, we found the IDPs 
(M=4.02, SD= 1.57) were significantly more likely to accept the Guterres framework than non-
IDPs (M=3.66, SD=1.74) (t(800)=-3.03, p<0.01) on a seven point Likert scale where 4 was the 
midpoint. 
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 Two additional questions in Study 2 concerned whether IDPs thought the burden of 
displacement was equally distributed between all GC citizens of the Republic of Cyprus and, if 
not, whether they were ready to take a more assertive stance on the need for a fairer 
redistribution. In both questions, a clear majority of IDPs felt unjustly treated, with 73.4 percent 
choosing the extreme end of a 7 point Likert scale; they also stated their readiness to take a more 
assertive stance in claiming a more equal redistribution, with 68.4 percent again choosing the 
extreme end of the scale (7).  
 About 55 percent of IDPs felt the place they left behind was part of their identity. About 
26.4 percent felt as their real home was their occupied home in the north, not their home in the 
south, whereas 24.5 percent felt their home was both. In a question on their wishes in handling 
their property, about 40 percent wanted only restitution for their property and would not accept 
any compensation when asked to give in percentage the portion of the valuation of their property 
that they would be willing to accept as compensation in cash.   
Focusing on the power-sharing provisions of the framework, we tested a model predicting 
support for a trade-off between a rotating presidency and the return of Morphou to Greek 
Cypriots in a model based on the variables of Appendix I in the supplemental material. Table 5 
shows the means, standard deviations and bivariate correlations of the variables. At first glance, 
the results suggest the majority of Greek Cypriots  are worried about Turkey interfering in the 
federal state, about getting a dysfunctional solution, and about  Greek Cypriots being un-ready  
for a possible solution. An exception is symbolic threats to Greek Cypriot way of life where the 
mean is very close to the midpoint (4) of the 7-point Likert scale. More participants show 
intergroup distrust than trust, and the majority is unable to recognise the positive effects of social 
interaction between the two communities that have grown exponentially since intergroup he 
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opening of the checkpoints in 2003 even though such interactions, namely intergroup contact, are 
empirically known for their positive effects on intergroup relations in a variety of contexts (e.g. 
McKeown and Psaltis, 2017). On the positive side, the majority of participants recognise the 
opportunities offered by a solution for economic development and free movement around 
Cyprus. 
The bivariate correlations indicate that IDPs and non-IDPs share the same level of fears and 
hopes for a solution. They also have the same level of trust, mention the same symbolic threats 
and express the same attitudes to the opening of the checkpoints. However, IDPs are more likely 
to support a rotating presidency with the return of Morphou, and, as noted above, significantly 
more likely to support a solution based on the Guterres framework.  
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Table 5 . Descriptive statistics and correlations between variables  
Variable M SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 
1. Gender (1=male, 
2=female) 
.54 .50  .00 -.19** .05 .03 .10** . 12** 13** -.12** -.03 .10** -.10** -.15** -.13** 
2. Age 53.95 17.58   .02 -.57** .04 -. 03 -.15** -.15** .18** .14** -.12** .04 .15** .07 
3. Income 4.39 2.17    .35** -.05 -. 16** -. 16** -.19** .09* -.02 -.08** .10** .10** .02 
4. Educational Level 4.27 2.17     -.04 -. 12** -. 03 -.01 -.06 -.14** -.04 .10** -.01 -.02 
5. IDP .41 .49      .05 .07 .06 .00 .00 .01 .01 -.05 .07* 
6. Interference by 
Turkey 
5.56 1.03       .44** . 61** -. 31** .02 .37** -.37** -.36** -.28** 
7. GC Un-readiness 4.25 1.29        . 31** -. 13** . 08* . 19** -.07* -.09* -.04 
8. Dysfunctionality  5.16 1.18         .-47** -. 20** . 41** -.44** -.52** -.37** 
9. Hope (Economic  
Opportunities) 
4.40 1.57          .24** -. 36** . 40** .44** .30** 
10. Hope (Free 
Movement) 
5.06 1.39           -.15** . 24** . 26** .22** 
11. Symbolic Threats 4.07 1.76            -.39** -. 55** -. 28** 
12. Pos. Att. Toward  
opening of 
c.points) 
3.21 1.03             .57** . 38** 
13. Trust 3.52 1.29              .39** 
14. Rotating 
Presidency 
.19 .39               
             * p<.05; ** p<.001;  
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We conducted additional analyses to determine levels of support for a rotating presidency 
using hierarchical binary logistic regression.We divided the predictor variables into three sets: 
respondents’ structural location (age, gender, education, income and IDP status; Model 1), hopes 
and fears of a federal arrangement (Model 2),  the variable of symbolic threat (Model 3) and 
variables related to confidence-building measures (attitudes to the opening of the checkpoints 
and intergroup trust; Model 4). Table 6 reports the cumulative results for all four models.  
Model 1 suggests men are more accepting of a rotating presidency than women, and the 
difference is statistically significant. IDPs are also more likely than non-IDPs to accept a rotating 
presidency. Age, education and income play no role.  
We then entered hopes and fears in the form of expecting positive or negative outcomes 
from a federal settlement in Model 2. This block of variables proved to be a very important 
predictor, as the Cox and Snell R² indicates an increase from 2.5 percent to 19.9 percent when 
the second block of variables was entered. Interference by Turkey and possible dysfunctionality 
of the reunited federal state are the major worries for GCs. Hope for economic development and 
free movement across Cyprus both increase the chance of accepting the rotating presidency in 
exchange for Morphou.  
Model 3 explores symbolic threat (Stephan and Stephan, 2000). The findings suggest it 
explains some additional variance. Both real and symbolic threats are well known in the social 
psychological literature as leading to reduced levels of trust, so we decided in the last block of 
the equation to add two variables as potentially more proximal predictors of acceptance of 
rotating presidency. Thus, Model 4 includes a set of variables relating to the social psychological 
element of trust and stance on one of the admittedly more successful confidence building 
measure, the opening of the checkpoints in 2003. The findings of Model 4 suggest the stance on 
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the opening of checkpoints and trust mediate the effect of hopes and fears on accepting or 
rejecting a rotating presidency; in this model, both variables of the new block are significant, and 
four out of five of the second block of variables (Hopes and Realistic Threats) become non-
significant. 
 
Table 6. Odds ratios for logistic regression of Greek Cypriot acceptance of rotating presidency 
with the return of Morphou 
 
Independent Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
     
Structural Factors     
     
Gender 
(1=Male; 0=Female) 
1.940*** 
(.204) 
1.724* 
(.234) 
1.664* 
(.239) 
1.567† 
(.242) 
     
Age 1.001 
(.007) 
1.000 
(.008) 
.996 
(.009) 
.993 
(.009) 
     
Income .998 
(.053) 
.922 
(.081) 
.928 
(.062) 
.927 
(.063) 
     
Educational level 
 
1.030 
(.083) 
1.031 
(.098) 
1.030 
(.083) 
.945 
(.102) 
     
 
IDP 
 
 
1.495* 
(.200) 
 
1.656* 
(.231) 
 
1.599* 
(.234) 
 
1.621* 
 (.240) 
     
Hopes and Realistic Threats     
     
Interference by Turkey  0.679** 
(.149) 
0.712* 
(.153) 
0.784 
(.180) 
     
GCs Unready for solution  1.381* 
(.113) 
1.391** 
(.112) 
1.214† 
(.106) 
     
Dysfunctionality of 
Federation 
 0.548*** 
(.130) 
0.588*** 
(.143) 
0.658** 
(.147) 
     
Hope for economic 
opportunities 
 1.317** 
(.095) 
1.289** 
(.096) 
1.180† 
(.112) 
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Hope for free movement  1.322** 
(.095) 
1.281** 
(.097) 
1.197† 
(.097) 
     
Symbolic threat   .801** 
(.074) 
.903 
(.083) 
     
CBM related     
     
Positive attitude to opening of 
checkpoints 
   1.495** 
(.141) 
     
Intergroup trust    1.349* 
(.136) 
     
     
Cox and Snell R2 2.5% 19.9% 21.1% 23.4% 
Number of respondents 668 639 639 639 
Significance: =not significant; †p<10; *p<.05; **p<.01; ***p<.001 
 
Notes:  
1. Numbers in parentheses are standard errors.  
2. For exact wording of questions and coding of variables, see Appendix 1 in supplemental 
material.  
 3. In this table and all following tables, we report odds ratios and standard errors (in 
parentheses), statistical significance of each coefficient and overall model fit. Odds ratios less 
than 1 indicate the given independent variables reduce the odds of the outcome. For example, in 
Model 1, the odds of males accepting power sharing in exchange for the return of Morphou are 
almost twice (1.94) the odds of females. Odds ratios less than 1 mean the given independent 
variable decreases the odds of the outcome. For example, an increase of one standard deviation 
in the belief in the dysfunctionality of the federation almost halves the odds of accepting a 
rotating presidency in Model 1. 
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Study 2 Discussion 
Even after the Crans Montana failure, 70.8 percent of Greek Cypriots rejected a two-state 
solution, and 58.2 percent are still committed to a bizonal bicommunal federation (BBF). In this 
post-Crans Montana period, the Guterres framework remains a viable option, as the majority is 
undecided on whether to accept or reject it. IDPs are readier than non-IDPs to accept a settlement 
along the Guterres framework, and the findings suggest this is partly explained by their greater 
readiness to accept the rotating presidency with the return of Morphou. However, this specific 
trade-off is not acceptable to the majority of GCs. As the majority is still undecided on the 
Guterres framework, however, there is clearly space for renegotiating ways of power-sharing 
beyond a rotating presidency – a give and take between aspects of the Gutteres framework that 
are of equal importance to the two communities (endorsing power sharing in return for security 
guarantees for example). One possibility is the exploration of a cross-community parliamentary 
system similar to that in Belgium or Switzerland (Cochrane et al., 2018) safeguarding the 
participation of TCs in power-sharing but without giving Turkey the power to block or influence 
decision-making.  
If there is a renewed effort to resolve the Cyprus problem, confidence building measures 
should be taken to improve the low levels of trust, as these play a significant role in reducing the 
acceptance of a compromise solution.5 The role of information and framing will be decisive, 
particularly among undecided Greek Cypriots, as demonstrated in comparable public opinion 
survey experiment settings elsewhere (see, for instance, Tanaka et al., 2017; Morgan-Jones et al. 
2019).  
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Conclusions  
In Cyprus and across divided societies, peace mediations are often ill-equipped to 
account for IDP views while existing political institutions (if they exist at all) explicitly 
marginalize displaced persons. The challenge of broad IDP inclusion in peace processes is not 
unique to Cyprus; as suggested elsewhere in the special issue, despite differences in regions and 
conflicts, most post-conflict peace settlements are brokered by those involved in the ongoing 
conflict and not so much by those with real stakes in tangible outcomes.  
IDP exclusion in cases such as Cyprus is puzzling given the prevailing narratives and 
runs counter to all efforts to settle the Cyprus issue. As our findings show displaced persons 
could positively influence the outcome of a future mediation in Cyprus. IDPs are a key electoral 
constituency likely to switch sides in elections or a referendum vote for a settlement largely 
depending on the degree they are consulted on the property issues and the negative or positive 
provisions on the right of return. For a successful mediation process, then, their distinctive 
features and preferences must be identified early in the process through for instance designated 
participation in technical committees on properties, the right of return and even diaspora 
returnees. 
Our most surprising survey finding was the positive change of attitude towards a future 
peace settlement, particularly among the undecided, if IDPs have the first say on their properties. 
This provision covers IDPs who wish to return to their pre-1974 homes and others who might 
choose compensation or exchange their properties for Turkish Cypriot land in the south. 
Although the percentage of IDPs varies, depending on our criteria, the number affected represent 
over half of the Greek Cypriot voters if we consider mixed-marriages between IDPs and the rest 
of the Greek Cypriot population (plus their descendants who might inherit these claims).6 
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Equally, a segment of the non-IDP Greek Cypriot population favours this arrangement likely 
because of its own understanding of a fair settlement.  
Interestingly, we found no evidence of the effect of demographic variables of age, level 
of education, and socio-economic status on the rotating presidency in any direction whatsoever. 
We began our discussion with the assumption that IDPs’ viewpoints are neglected in the peace 
process. Yet we demonstrate that their status as the primary stakeholders will determine support 
for a prospective agreement. Our findings provide conclusive evidence that IDP status along with 
social psychological processes (i.e. contact) are the primary predictors of this support while 
demographics have little explanatory power. Similarly, previous research argues that when 
models are firmly grounded in theory, demographics should only serve as a useful summary not 
as causal variable.  We suggest the acceptance or rejection of this particular element of give and 
take, beyond IDP status, is largely dependent on the hopes and fears of the wider public, 
irrespective of their age and educational level.  
Our findings demonstrate the critical role of IDP-specific research in conflict resolution 
studies, particularly power-sharing settlements. Contrary to much of the literature on the 
radicalization of displaced persons  (Achvarina and Reich, 2006; Choi and Piazza 2016; Bohnet 
et al, 2018), IDP status among Greek Cypriots appears to be associated with higher levels of 
support for peace processes. While conclusions and recommendations cannot be generalised 
beyond our specific case and survey results, our questionnaire and methodology offer a useful 
tool for comparable situations where return options constitute a critical priority among displaced 
communities. Comparable research by Khalil Shikaki and Dahlia Scheindlin among Palestinians 
suggests that refugees are more likely to accept a peace plan than non-displaced Palestinians (39 
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percent compared to 35 for non-refugees) indicating similar trends even in more polarized 
environments.7  
 Our surveys of IDPs and non-IDPs demonstrate critical limitations of public support for 
specific provisions of the current peace processes. In terms of power-sharing, we find that 
rotating the presidency between the Greek and Turkish Cypriots could potentially lead to a No 
vote in the Greek Cypriot community. Additional incentives and a more nuanced discourse on 
issues of governance might be needed in justifying these options. Alternatively, leaders might 
switch towards parliamentary options. Although the argument that a presidential form of power-
sharing would not be optimal for Cyprus is not new (see McGarry 2017), our evidence should 
caution all sides in Cyprus to reconsider alternatives that match the interests of the two main 
communities in Cyprus including victim groups, women and the island’s smaller communities.   
Finally, our findings suggest how IDP-specific research could facilitate peace mediations. 
Rather than advocating partition that would force sides to accept previous ethnic cleansing as a 
given and remain permanently hostile, a better approach would be to create credible incentives to 
all sides. A significant first step is to investigate what victims and other individuals to be affected 
by the settlement actually want. Our findings suggests that examining in advance the views 
of displaced persons – those who lost their homes and those who ended up occupying another 
person’s property – is extremely important. In Cyprus, years of peace talks have been wasted, 
with sides discussing technical and top-down criteria on the allocation of disputed properties 
rather than engaging directly with property owners/occupants. To avoid this problem, bottom-up 
solutions should be sought involving owners and users themselves. For instance, a census-style 
approach would largely avoid current unresolvable dilemmas while coming to win-win, 
generous, and acceptable terms with the majority of individual owners and users. A 
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comprehensive census survey of preferences among all displaced persons would address the 
insecurities of Turkish Cypriots about how many Greek Cypriots want to have their properties 
reinstated. Our findings suggest the Turkish Cypriot position for majority ownership in its 
constituent state could be fairly easily addressed without contradicting the rights of legal 
owners.8 If Greek Cypriot IDPs are asked about their intentions first, this could be the most 
important factor in determining a Yes vote in a referendum.  
IDPs constitute a category of citizens in peace processes with both higher stakes and 
different preferences. Contrary to current the literature that identifies the dangers of securitizing 
refugees and IDPs (Jaconsen 2002; Greenhill, 2010), our study is the first to highlight, through 
survey data, the positive impact IDPs could have on peace processes. We therefore advocate 
broader IDP participation in power-sharing settlements to ensure the longevity of peace 
arrangements. As in Cyprus, related research elsewhere across conflict-ridden societies could 
guide decisions on peace processes. For instance, future IDP-specific surveys could be relevant 
in Sri Lanka, Colombia or Nagorno-Karabakh, where the ratification of peace settlements and 
IDP rights are unambiguously interlinked, and local peace referendums have been central in the 
mediators’ agendas.  
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1 For exceptions see Koser (2007), Hadjipavlou (2007), Shikaki (2009), Toal and O’Louglin (2013), Irwin (2018). 
2 After Crans Montana, the Turkish Cypriot leader and representatives of the Turkish government made statements 
suggesting the main reason for the collapse of negotiations was the failure of GC leadership to accept power sharing. 
3 The net sample of households visited was 2,252; contact rate was 83 percent, co-operation rate 43.8 percent and 
response rate 36 percent. 
4 It is important to note however that later research undertaken after 2018 suggested that supporters of BBF in the 
GC community increased by at least 10%. 
5 Special attention should be given to how the Greek Cypriot press presents the negotiations; a significant number of 
the media exacerbate fears (see [name omitted] under review), a major factor in the rejection of power-sharing 
arrangements. 
6 For a discussion of the rights and identity formation of IDP descendants see Hadjiyanni (2002) 
7See panel discussion at Mitvim Institute at https://p-upload.facebook.com/Mitvim/posts/2116956235028539  & 
Khalil Shikaki's Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research http://www.pcpsr.org/en/node/154 
8 For a related proposal and its specific advantages in terms of IDP inclusion, see  
http://ucy.ac.cy/dir/documents/dir/cpsaltis/Proposal_for_Property_Census_2017.pdf 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
